Contradiction between sharp propositions is a major engine of progress in logic, both in reasoning and in related tasks. And yet, in communicative practice, we often try to avoid conflict, and logic also has several strategies for 'defusing' contradictions. This paper discusses some of these, including changes of arity for predicates, relativization of domains, and retreat to weaker statements about agents' beliefs. We note a few folklore facts about the reach of these methods, and then relate the balance between accepting and defusing contradictions to issues in belief revision and game theory. In doing so, we place 'relativism' in a setting of information dynamics: an optimal take on a contradiction depends on its success in facilitating subsequent communication. between what used to be thought of as major alternatives in reasoning with recursion:
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Once an atomic statement Px is reached, one tests if M, s |= Px, and Verifier wins if this atom is true, while Falsifier wins otherwise.
It is well-known that a first-order statement is true in a model iff Verifier has a winning strategy in the associated evaluation game, while Falsifier has a winning strategy if the formula is false. Thus, indeed truth (or falsity) emerges in the clash of opinions.
Arguing about consistency: proof and model building If no concrete situation is at hand for inspection, as in many conversations, and also scientific reasoning, logic again celebrates crucial episodes of disagreement. When we can derive a contradiction from your and my opinions, we have a clear clash that calls for action. And the contradiction need not even be between human agents: if you observe something that contradicts your current beliefs (Nature's views are inconsistent with yours), you change your beliefs.
But even prior to that, seeing if there is a contradiction in the first place may involve opposite claims. The well-known method of 'semantic tableaux' can be cast as a game between two players. 'Builder' claims the consistency of all assertions made at the start and says that they have a model, while her opponent 'Critic' claims there is no model, and some contradiction can be made manifest. If Builder has a winning strategy, it will generate models of the data, while winning strategies for Critic will be proofs of contradictions from the data. Again, conflicting claims are the trigger, and the basic logical notions of model and proof emerge in one single setting. Similar roles play in legal procedure between lawyers and prosecutors (as well as judge, jury, or defendant).
More examples could be given, but my point is that well-defined conflict lies at the heart of logic, and it is even useful to seek it in settings where you might not expect it.
But this is only one side of the story. Here is another way of thinking about the above logic games, starting with what may just seem a little cloud on the horizon.
Private interpretation?
The above crisp scenarios have unrealistic features when going from formal to natural language. Not all atomic tests in evaluation or discussion games need be clear-cut episodes. Many linguistic expressions contain 'theoretical predicates', such as 'fragile', 'trivial', or 'helpful', whose interpretation leaves room for manoevre.
(In Carnap's terms, these are 'dispositional' expressions, in between observation and theory.) Though agents in our disagreement game scenario may share an observational 4 vocabulary on whose interpretation they agree, they still have great freedom how to interpret these further terms -and an atomic test whether "Mr. X is helpful" may well depend on what the 'owner' of this atomic claim at the final stage means by it.
'Open' games This more fluid setting is not a mere nuisance: it may even be of interest to adapt logic games. Tracking rules of defense and attack identifies the player whose claim is at stake at any stage. (Positive occurrences of atomic sub-formulas in the initial formula, lying under an even number of negations, would be owned by the Verifier, and negative ones by Falsifier.) In particular, in a free-standing atomic formula p, Verifier's claim is at stake, and it seems reasonable to let her interpretation of p count in the test.
By contrast, in a free-standing negation ¬p, a role switch has taken place, and Falsifier now owns the claim, viz. that p is false: so he has a right to determine the interpretation.
In addition to such 'shaky atoms', players may still agree on the interpretation of part of the vocabulary, of course. Such extended evaluation games are still related to the earlier games, now for modified formulas, substituting 'True' for shaky atoms owned by Verifier (assuming that she will choose interpretations making her win), and 'False' for those owned by Falsifier. There are more intrinsic new features, too. But my point here is just that 'simple' logical scenarios of disagreement may not be so simple -even though we can adapt our game modeling, and logic does not go out of the door.
'Open' debates? Likewise, one can cast debates so as to allow for a special role of the theoretical vocabulary. Here is an example of additional freedom for agents, just to show a tactic different from the above one. Distinguishing shared vocabulary P from freely interpretable vocabulary Q, a clash of opinions between prima facie contradictory assertions ϕ(P, Q) and ¬ϕ(P, Q) now becomes a consistency problem for the formula ∃Q ϕ(P, Q) ∧ ∃Q' ¬ϕ(P, Q').
But here we find a surprise: logical theorems may bear on conversational issues.
Theory-laden clashes in this format add no disagreements beyond the base level:
If ∃Q ϕ(P, Q) ∧ ∃Q' ¬ϕ(P, Q') is inconsistent, ∃Q ϕ(P, Q) → ∀Q' ϕ(P, Q') is valid. But then, by the Interpolation Theorem for first-order logic, there is a formula α(P) in the P-vocabulary only, with |= ϕ(P, Q) → α(P) → ϕ(P, Q').
But then ∃Q ϕ(P, Q) implies α(P), while ∃Q' ¬ϕ(P, Q') implies ¬α(P).
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Thus, α(P) versus ¬α(P) is still a base-level disagreement between the two parties.
Still, clearly, ϕ(P, Q) ∧ ¬ϕ(P, Q') may well have become consistent -in which case the prima facie disagreement has gone away. This 'predicate splitting' will return below. (Gärdenfors & Rott (1995) ) note a contradiction, accept it as stated, and then revise in Ramsey's terms: "give up enough old beliefs to accommodate the favoured new proposition contradicting them".
But this response is not the only one, and perhaps not even the prevalent one.
Para-consistency Perhaps the most striking trend today that refuses to be budged by a contradiction is the use of a para-consistent logic that tolerates inconsistencies. This is often motivated by an appeal to real behaviour: our beliefs are full of inconsistencies, but as long as we compartmentalize things, we can still draw a lot of useful inferences, and there is no need to throw away an inconsistent theory. While I agree with the latter observation, I do not think it follows that we need a logic that tolerates manifest contradictions, once they have come to our attention. What will ever jolt our creative imagination, if not a contradiction? But I admit life is easy on a para-consistent atoll:
one can be informed of the most blatant contradictions, tune out, and happily turn to something else -even without a minimal relativist effort to patch up things somewhat.
Giving up, and holding on But then, I admit that I have never felt great resonance to the para-consistent stance. To me, contradiction is a major engine of progress in logic.
But just how? On the simplest account, that we all know, the response is easy. We have been too greedy. The sum total of all our beliefs is untenable, and we must now retreat, saving chunks of the earlier theory, hopefully large useful ones. This pattern often makes a lot of sense when adjusting our beliefs to reality, and indeed, it underlies the state change driving modern belief revision theories (though more on that below).
But responses can be much more sophisticated. Think of the medieval recommendation "In case of a contradiction, make a distinction", that 'repairs' contradictions instead of accepting them at face value. I will discuss a few ways in which this works, making strategies for relativism more concrete. Everything I have to say is quite elementary.
7
My cues come from the neglected gem Weinberger (1965) , an original study of repair mechanisms, in logical practice, but also in the history of science. I will discuss two.
Arity Raising One major line, reflecting modern contextualism, is the 'Arity Raising
Strategy': "give some predicate a new argument that can vary in the given assertions".
What is helpful to you need not be helpful to me, what is true in your pragmatic context need not be true in mine, and so on. Examples also occur in science, as Weinberger points out: to the Eleatics, things both moved and did not move, but physics added the parameter of a 'frame of reference'. Technically, this strategy takes one or more k-ary More generally, the earlier drastic method of marking predicates still works:
Fact Each predicate-logical formula ϕ becomes consistent when all occurrences of predicate letters P are made disjoint, in variants P, P', P'', … Proof Without loss of generality, move negations in ϕ inside until they stand in front of atoms. This does not multiply occurrences of atoms, and the result is an equivalent formula built from literals (atoms and negated atoms) using only conjunction, disjunction, universal and existential quantification. Now consider a one-object model, where both quantifiers amount to just the identity operation. Make all predicates with positive occurrences of their single atom true, and all others false. This makes all atoms and negated atoms in the formula true, and the quantifiers, conjunction, and disjunction in ϕ do not change truth, so the whole compound formula is true as well. ■ Of course, this is overly drastic in real settings, and it is an interesting technical issue which minimal forms of 'surgery' will make a given formula consistent. But anyway, the point of these results is not that they are realistic methods in practice. They just show that contradictions can always be removed. And once you have seen that in principle, more intelligent versions can be found. And as a further point, we see that logical methods like semantic tableaus are a two-edged sword. They can be used to detect inconsistencies, but for that very reason, they can also be used to avoid them! Domain Restriction While Arity Raising is a context-related tactic, Weinberger also discusses a second method, reflecting another ubiquitous phenomenon in natural language, viz. the implicit domain dependence of quantifiers. Even when not explicitly marked, quantified noun phrases come with restrictions on their range. When I say that "No student passed the exam" I always mean students from some relevant domain.
Indeed, there is a whole semantic literature on how such implicit quantifier domains can shift inside and across sentences when we use natural language (Westerståhl (1984) acceptance and language change into one account of how we learn (cf. Parikh (2009)).
So, we end up somewhere in the middle: logic is about sophisticated truth clashes.
Avoiding contradiction in the setting of agency
Our conclusion in the preceding section refers to beliefs. And this suggests an extension of our discussion going beyond Weinberger (1965) . It takes two to disagree, and hence agents enter the picture. Then we must move to logics of knowledge or belief, including recent dynamic versions. Here is my favourite setting for disagreement scenarios:
Belief juxtaposition In logics of agency, a third mechanism of defusing contradictions arises naturally. Its point of entry is this. When people make assertions ϕ, there is a long-standing issue of just what they are saying. Do they know the stated proposition ϕ, do they only believe it, or in between, do they perhaps believe that they know? The latter agent-relative information is not just a ploy: serious communication scenarios in logic, computer science, and game theory are driven by epistemic information, not about base facts, but what other agents know or believe (Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (1982) , Fagin, Halpern, Moses & Vardi (1995) , van Benthem (to appear)).
We cannot really relativize by saying that one agent knows that ϕ and the other that ¬ϕ, since this would leave the contradiction intact, now in the veridicality of knowledge.
But of course, the retreat to beliefs is a powerful way of avoiding contradictions.
Fact If both ϕ and ¬ϕ are consistent propositional formulas, then so is B 1 ϕ ∧ B 2 ¬ϕ.
Proof Just take the space of all propositional valuations, and add any plausibility order for 1 that puts the ϕ-worlds on top, and for 2 that puts the ¬ϕ-worlds on top. ■ Note that, in a sense, this move still exemplifies both earlier strategies, as we relativized ϕ, ¬ϕ to different sets of worlds, so we add a parameter, and also restrict domains. We will focus on the agency aspects per se from now on, leaving this technical aspect aside.
Also, note that this construction does not work with 'inner inconsistencies'. If one of ϕ, ¬ϕ is a contradiction (say, the agents dispute the truth of some mathematical law), then we need more finely-structured belief models -or, one of our earlier tactics for first defusing the internal contradiction in what was communicated by one of the agents. and passing information about conflicts of opinion can have quite unexpected effects.
Taking agency seriously
We will now make a few points about these in a more logical perspective:
'The next stage': relativism and information dynamics Achieving consistency is only the beginning of a story. We do this out of a further interest (otherwise, why bother?):
say, to facilitate a subsequent conversation, or even further research. Language and communication are all about successive assertions that modify the context, domains of discourse, and perhaps even arities of predicates describing events at various levels of detail. And that would also be our general take on the importance of understanding relativism. Dealing with disagreement is not of much interest per se, as a 'static' issue between propositions. But it is important as an issue in the dynamics of information flow and communication between agents and communities. But then, the real test of a take on relativism is whether it is successful in initiating further discourse dynamics.
This theme is found in 'dynamic-epistemic logics' of hard and soft information, that study how agents gather and exchange information, and update knowledge and beliefs accordingly (Baltag & Moss (2004) , van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi (2007) , Baltag & Smets (2006) , van Benthem (to appear)). Technically, this dynamics changes epistemic-doxastic agent models by eliminating worlds and/or modifying epistemic accessibility and doxastic plausibility relations. In such a framework, the key issue is identifying which dynamic acts are crucial to an agent scenario. In fact, the above belief juxtaposition already contained two of these, reflecting intriguing dynamic scenarios that have attracted attention in recent years. Both have to do with conflicts in beliefs.
Belief merge When agents meet, with their knowledge and beliefs encoded in private epistemic-doxastic models, then, to get fruitful interaction going, they must merge into a shared group model. There is no consensus in the literature on an optimal mechanism for such a merge, and I just gave a simple propositional case. The general desideratum
here is a shared model that leaves people their beliefs as far as possible, and that still works in the appropriate language with (iterated) belief operators for both agents.
Belief update But merging is just a start. Once a shared model is in place, further information exchange can start. In that second phase, initial beliefs of agents may change, depending on how reliable one takes others to be. Dynamic-epistemic logics have many mechanisms for this (cf. van Benthem (to appear)), and more are emerging.
Baltag & Smets (2009) Announcing that B 1 p ∧B 2 ¬p may be seen as a soft plausibility-introducing upgrade to a situation with different priors for the two agents:
The result is that the disagreement B 1 p ∧B 2 ¬p has become common knowledge.
But things can be more complicated when agents have different hard information, and in that case, communicating disagreement may actually resolve the conflict in beliefs:
Scenario 2: Agent 1 knows that p is true in the actual world to the left, but 2 does notand the following picture is common knowledge:
Now B 1 p ∧ B 2 ¬p cannot become common knowledge by a soft update introducing a plausibility relation that respects the given epistemic accessibility relation. The reason is that 1 will never believe that p in the world to the right. But this difficulty arises 14 because 1 has hard information that 2 still lacks. Thus, the agents need to communicate first to get into a better epistemic-doxastic balance. Indeed, communicating the very disagreement will help both: B 1 p ∧ B 2 ¬p can be true in the actual world only, because, no matter how we take the plausibility relation, 1 can only believe p in that world. Thus, the model reduces to the single actual world to the left, with both equally informed. The result is of course mutual agreement, and indeed this is common knowledge.
Scenario 3:
Here is a more complex initial setting, with further initial beliefs present.
In the actual world on the top left, 2 believes that ¬p, but she does not know what 1 believes about p (to the right, he believes that ¬p, while to the left, he believes that p but does not know p) and hence she does not know whether they disagree about p: This shows that we are not studying one process of belief merge and communication:
that would be an elusive quest. We must understand the general phenomenon, including the fact, known from the philosophical literature, that 1 plus 1 = 3 in this setting. When two agents meet, three actors result: the separate agents, and the group of them both.
And we also see our earlier point demonstrated: disagreement and agreement become rich phenomena in such a group setting, far beyond single-minded takes on relativism.
What I am not saying here is that dynamic epistemic logic solves all dynamic aspects of relativism in beliefs, but rather, how it enables us to see more of its full wealth.
Update and language change: re-interpretation once more Indeed, our original problems have not disappeared. All these scenarios of communicating disagreement or agreement get more complicated when agents become aware of their language -either because they must merge private languages, or because they worry whether they mean 
Conclusion
I started out by saying that logic thrives with clear-cut opinions and disagreements. But I then pointed out that the very tools developed for those purposes of clarity and dissent can also be used to defuse disagreements, and provide logical methods for what we often do in daily practice: walk around conflict. I find it hard to take a crisp stance.
Total accommodation of differences in claims stifles progress, and makes a mockery of learning. But taking every contradiction at face value is the sign of an uncultivated mind. Where is the middle ground? Formal logic serves both extremes, as well as mixtures: but finding the right balance remains a matter of good 'rational sense'.
I have also tried to shift the discussion a bit. Relativism as a general concern sounds farfetched at times, but relativism as a label for dealing with conflicts in communication is highly realistic. I have proposed a broader stance on the dynamics of communication,
including processes of merging beliefs and further information exchange afterwards.
While this makes the theme richer, including links to game theory, a similar tension 16 returns. On the one hand, dynamic epistemic logics and formal learning theories follow the line that observations contradicting our beliefs are the engine of progress. But on the other, there are respectable logical mechanisms that can soften the blow, and make new evidence consistent with old beliefs. Finding the right mixture seems important to understanding real conversation and argument, but how to do it in a natural manner?
Finally, to return to an issue raised briefly in the Introduction, language change tactics naturally lead to the theme of translation. If you think that my true p is your false p', we can translate your discourse into mine. Underneath surface differences in opinion, there can be invariances modulo translation. I leave this theme to another occasion, since this paper has already become quite long for someone who promised he had little to say.
